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In the toxic tort context, both litigation and regulation require reliable
scientific data to establish a causal connection between exposure to
some substance and alleged harm before allowing recovery or
mandating mitigation. On the one hand, it is important for litigation
and regulation to be based on causal evidence of actual harms.
Otherwise, these interventions could make society worse off by unduly
limiting the availability of useful substances and diverting resources
away from addressing true risks. On the other hand, for this system to
comprehensively address all important environmental externalities,
there must exist sufficient incentives to generate the data required for
effective risk-management through litigation and regulation.
* Caroline Cecot is an Assistant Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School at George
Mason University. I am grateful to Yehonatan Arbel, Jake Byl, Joni Hersch, Benjamin McMichael, Jordan Neyland, Piotr Pilarski, Teddy Rave, Richard Revesz, Edward Richards, Anthony
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This Article argues that, in many cases, the incentives are insufficient.
When it comes to latent harms, in particular, scientific research
evaluating causal links is challenging and expensive. Independent
researchers, who require funding for their work, are unlikely to
systematically analyze the effects of new substances. To date, there are
thousands of unstudied substances in use.
Given the increasing importance of reliable scientific data for efficient
risk management, it is time to evaluate all options for incentivizing its
production in order to promote optimal deterrence in the toxic tort
context. This Article proposes several ways to combat the persistent
data lag, including changes to tort common law and regulation. Most
controversially, it proposes a new tort cause of action for informational
monitoring and analysis in some circumstances when there exist no
reliable studies on the potential harm of a particular substance. A
successful claim would lead to the establishment of a scientific panel,
paid for by the defendant, to analyze and monitor the link between
exposure to the substance and subsequent health outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, a group of West Virginia residents sued E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours and Company (DuPont) alleging that the company contaminated the group’s water supply with a substance referred to as C-8.1
The group blamed C-8 for more than thirty different diseases, including asthma, high cholesterol, kidney cancer, and birth defects.2 DuPont had used C-8 in its manufacturing process for Teflon and other
related products since the 1950s, but there was little scientific evidence
available about the long-term effects of exposure to C-8.3 In particular, there were no epidemiological studies linking the substance to any
specific condition, the company never tested the long-term effects of
exposure to the substance, other researchers had not studied this is1. See In re E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig., No. 2:13-CV-170, 2016
WL 659112, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2016); Leach v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 01-C608, 2002 WL 1270121, at *3 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002). C-8, also known as perfluorooctanoic acid, is part of a chemical family of manmade substances. For a comprehensive description
of DuPont’s actions, the litigation, and the evidence generated by the settlement, see Laura Hall,
Alastair Iles & Rachel Morello-Frosch, Litigating Toxic Risks Ahead of Regulation: Biomonitoring Science in the Courtroom, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 19–24, 38–42 (2012); Thomas O. McGarity,
The Complementary Roles of Common Law Courts and Federal Agencies in Producing and Using Policy-Relevant Scientific Information, 37 ENVTL. L. 1027, 1038–49 (2007).
2. In re E. I. Du Pont, 2016 WL 659112, at *3.
3. See id. at *1. A previous lawsuit alleging that the health troubles of a family’s cattle herd
were due to DuPont’s discharges of C-8 was settled under confidential circumstances. See Hall,
Iles & Morello-Frosch, supra note 1, at 20.
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sue, and the local population did not have sufficient information or
resources to generate this costly evidence.4
In most courts these days, such a lawsuit would get tossed. But surprisingly, after making a series of tentative findings related to the
presence of C-8 in the water supply and DuPont’s increasing internal
questioning about C-8’s toxicity (revealed after limited disclosure), a
state district court certified the group of nearby residents as a class
under Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure.5 In particular, despite the fact that the group’s members alleged different exposures and a variety of injuries, the court
determined that there existed important common issues related to
general causation, satisfying the key “commonality” requirement
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A).6 Class certification prodded DuPont to agree
to fund a $20 million study about the effects of C-8 exposure, which
ultimately linked exposure to six of the alleged diseases.7 This study
provided a wealth of information, not only to the class members but
also to society at large. In fact, the study has helped trigger subsequent actions by state and federal agencies to regulate C-8 under their
existing authorities.8
The underlying scenario—a population exposed to some unstudied
substance9—is all too common, but the resolution—the defendant
funds a study to determine whether exposure to the substance caused
plaintiffs’ injuries—is rare. Without some scientific data substantiating
a link between exposure to a substance and a specific harm, classes
usually do not get certified and plaintiffs usually cannot survive summary judgment. On the one hand, this makes sense. Litigation, like
regulation, should be based on reliable scientific evidence in order to
allocate societal resources toward mitigating real risks. On the other
hand, the typical outcome exacerbates a problem with risk-manage4. See generally In re E. I. Du Pont, 2016 WL 659112.
5. Leach, 2002 WL 1270121, at *18. West Virginia’s Rule 23 is identical to the federal Rule 23.
Compare W. VA. R. CIV. P. 23, with FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
6. Leach v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 01-C-608, 2002 WL 1270121, at *10 (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002). The group also satisfied the “numerosity” and “typicality” requirements.
Id. at *9, *11.
7. In re E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig., No. 2:13-CV-170, 2016 WL
659112, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2016).
8. See e.g., Amena H. Saiyid, EPA to List Nonstick Toxics as Hazardous Substances This Year,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Apr. 9, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/epa-to-list-nonstick-toxics-as-hazardous-substances-this-year-1. See generally
McGarity, supra note 1, at 1038–49 (describing cooperation between agencies in light of the
DuPont litigation).
9. This Article focuses on the toxic tort context, but some of the concerns raised might be
mirrored in other contexts such as the products liability context.
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ment schemes in the United States: Both litigation and regulation require scientific data in order to effectively manage risk, but there exist
insufficient incentives to generate this costly evidence.
Toxic tort claims are expensive and difficult to litigate, even when
plaintiffs allege harms from well-documented toxic substances that
cause signature diseases.10 The long average latency periods for various known disease-causing substances—for example, twenty-five
years for arsenic and eighteen years for asbestos11—frustrate efforts
to link any injury to the defendant’s past conduct.12 And, of course,
there is the risk that, by the time plaintiffs manifest their injuries, the
defendant may be insolvent, difficult to find, or long out of business.13
Without existing scientific evidence that establishes a link between a
substance and some harm, plaintiffs are generally unable to bring successful claims. To succeed on a toxic tort claim, for example, courts
typically require plaintiffs to establish both general and specific causation.14 General causation focuses on whether a substance is capable of
causing plaintiffs’ injuries15 and often requires plaintiffs to present epidemiological evidence demonstrating the link.16 Once plaintiffs prove
general causation, they must prove that their specific injuries were
caused by the defendant’s conduct in exposing them to the substance.
When no epidemiological data on the effects of a substance exists, a
few courts might allow plaintiffs to generate data on general and spe10. One common example is the link between exposure to asbestos and mesothelioma. See
Hall, Iles & Morello-Frosch, supra note 1, at 16.
11. Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L. J. 849, 852 n.15 (1988).
12. See e.g., Arvin Maskin, Konrad L. Cailteux & Joanne M. McLaren, Medical Monitoring: A
Viable Remedy for Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 521, 526–27 (2000) (“[T]he longer the latency period, the more likely
that plaintiffs will have exercised other lifestyle or occupational choices that arguably could have
contributed to their illness, rendering a verdict against the defendants less likely.”).
13. There is a large literature comparing the relative effectiveness of litigation versus regulation. Compare Peter Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental
Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 93–94 (1991) (discussing the limits of tort litigation in the environmental context), with Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism: The Discovery of Better Environmental Policy, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 737–39 (2008) (describing
the ways that the common law can lead to more efficient environmental policy by providing
more opportunities to adjust to changes in technology, societal preferences, and experiential
learning).
14. Plaintiffs usually bear the burden of proof on causation for most causes of action under
the common law.
15. Michael D. Green, D. Mical Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 392 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 2d ed. 2000).
16. MICHAEL DORE, 3 LAW OF TOXIC TORTS § 28:34 (2019) (discussing the trend away from
admitting evidence relying only on data from animal bioassays).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL208.txt

2020]

unknown

THE DATA GAP

Seq: 5

21-APR-20

11:52

301

cific causation through the adversarial process.17 But even if courts
allow it, the adversarial process is an inapt way of developing and establishing new scientific evidence and conclusions.18 Meanwhile, reliable epidemiological analysis typically costs millions.19 Potential
plaintiffs would face significant incentives to free ride on others’ expenditures in generating this evidence; once generated, anyone can
use such evidence in future litigation or regulation.20
In most of these cases, plaintiffs would also be unable to recover for
diagnostic tests and other health monitoring for latent injuries. Although courts in many states have recognized claims or remedies for
medical monitoring under some circumstances,21 these courts typically
require plaintiffs to present substantial scientific information, too. A
plaintiff must demonstrate, among other things, that it is more likely
than not that the plaintiff will develop a disease and that monitoring
could lead to an improved outcome through early detection and treatment.22 In other words, there must exist not only significant scientific
knowledge about the link between exposure to a substance and a future harm, but also medical advancements in the treatment of that
harm. The rationale for blocking claims without this evidence is again
reasonable: Courts fear a flood of frivolous lawsuits that can waste
17. Some courts, for example, have allowed dueling experts to testify on general causation
when no epidemiological evidence exists. See J.C. McElveen, How is Epidemiologic Evidence
Admitted as Proof of Causation?, in 2 TOXIC TORTS PRAC. GUIDE § 16:7 (Karen A. Gottlieb ed.,
2018). See also Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 700 (2007).
18. See discussion infra Part II. For recent concerns about this, see Sara Randazzo, In
Roundup Case, the Science Will Go on Trial First, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2019, 10:58 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/in-roundup-case-the-science-will-go-on-trial-first-11550246311.
19. In the DuPont case, the parties agreed to independent epidemiological analysis paid for by
the defendant, which cost $20 million. See In re E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers.
Injury Litig., No. 2:13-CV-170, 2016 WL 659112, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2016).
20. The epidemiological data that supports toxic tort litigation can be thought of as a public
good.
21. In 2005, thirteen states and the District of Columbia recognized medical monitoring absent a present physical injury, while sixteen states explicitly rejected a claim for medical monitoring, four states had not articulated a test, and eighteen states had not been faced with the
question. D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach
the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1095, 1114–15 (2006). Since 2005, a few more states have weighed in on the availability
of this claim. When allowed, such a claim or remedy usually provides for a court-administered
fund that pays out expenses for diagnostic tests and other health monitoring. See Logan
Glasenapp, Judicially Sanctioned Environmental Injustice: Making the Case for Medical Monitoring, 49 N.M. L. REV. 59, 74–75 (2019).
22. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 816 (Cal. 1993); Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 71 A.3d 30, 81–82 (Md. 2013); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,
858 P.2d 970, 976 (Utah 1993).
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valuable judicial and defendant resources, which could otherwise be
used to compensate presently injured plaintiffs.23
Currently, there are thousands of substances for which we do not
have sufficient data regarding their effects on human populations.24
Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)—the federal statute
governing substances used in industrial processes—the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) can act to restrict substances only if it
proves that the substances present an unreasonable risk of harm.25
This is consistent with the reality that regulation, if it is to be welfareenhancing, requires significant amounts of information.26 Otherwise,
the regulation would likely do more harm than good. The EPA generally does not require firms to provide toxicological data for any substances used in their industrial processes.27 There is widespread
agreement that the pace of research on unstudied substances is too
slow; this was one of Congress’s motivations in passing an amendment
to the TSCA in 2016.
This Article highlights the problem of insufficient and persistently
lagging epidemiological data or other reliable scientific information
on potential harms from exposure to substances. The difficulties plaintiffs face in recovering for harms ex post means that firms face insufficient pressure to evaluate and then mitigate the risk of harms ex ante.
The lack of information also makes it impossible for regulators to efficiently manage harms ex ante. The result is that firms might overuse
potentially harmful substances and reduce social welfare. In these
cases, the value of generating this information is highest particularly
23. This is not an abstract fear. In one of the cases motivating the hypothetical, the analysis
cost $12 million, and the defendant went bankrupt as a result. See Sara Jerving, Report: Tainted
Soil Near Tonawanda Coke, INVESTIGATIVE POST (Jan. 16, 2019), http://www.investigativepost
.org/2019/01/16/report-tainted-soil-near-tonawanda-coke/; Daniel Telvock, Tonawanda Coke
Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, WIVB.COM (Oct. 16, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://www.wivb.com/
news/local-news/tonawanda-coke-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy/1528121691.
24. For example, there are more than 80,000 substances on the Toxic Substances Control Act’s
inventory for which there is no reliable information on harms. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-06–1032T, CHEMICAL REGULATION: ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EPA’S CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 1 (2006).
25. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(a) (West 2016) (“If the Administrator determines . . . that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities, presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment, the Administrator shall by rule . . . apply one or more of the following
requirements to such substance or mixture to the extent necessary so that the chemical substance
or mixture no longer presents such risk . . . .”).
26. Interestingly, DuPont argued that any tort litigation should wait until “State administrative agencies” resolved the issue of general causation. See Leach v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., No. 01-C-608, 2002 WL 1270121, at *10 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002).
27. The requirement is triggered when the company has reason to believe a substance is harmful. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2607(e) (West 2016).
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because no current data exists. Any monitoring or analysis could benefit others by providing valuable new information—positive or negative—about the risks of the substance at issue.
In Part I, this Article describes why this data gap exists. It also explains why such data is important for creating incentives for optimal
environmental health and safety, whether these incentives emerge privately through contracts or tort litigation or publicly through regulatory law.28 The Article then explores potential solutions to this
persistent data gap. In Part II, the Article offers ways that tort law can
address the data gap, drawing inspiration from a few distinctive cases.
In particular, it proposes a new tort cause of action that, if clearly
defined and adequately limited, could play a role in systematically
generating this information. In Part III, the Article offers two regulatory options for addressing the data gap.
As long as humans continue to innovate, new substances will
emerge. Optimal standards of care are not static; they change over
time based on new information of risks.29 Robust and reliable data on
the risks of these substances, especially when potential harms may be
latent, is expected to lag. But the tolerance for expected lags obscures
the fact that there are persistent barriers to the production of such
data. Standards of care will not become optimal over time if there are
insufficient incentives to measure and evaluate the effects of new and
old substances. This Article describes this persistent data gap, highlights its importance, and explores ways to make sure that incentives
for generating this data are present.
I. A PERSISTENT DATA GAP
Our risk-management system relies on information about risks of
new products or processes emerging over time. But when harms are
latent, it is expensive and difficult to make these causal links. This Part
28. The Article focuses on optimal deterrence and risk mitigation because, I argue, the persistent data gap must be solved in order for tort law to fulfill this objective. The data gap does not
need to be solved in order for tort or regulatory law to achieve other objectives, such as compensation for victims.
29. See Surajeet Chakravarty, David Kelsey & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Tort Liability and Unawareness, GEO. L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS & OTHER WORKS 2067, 19–25 (2019), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2067/ (describing and modeling how a negligence liability rule
in tort litigation spreads awareness of new information about what due care requires); see also
Alfred Endres & Regina Bertram, The Development of Care Technology under Liability Law, 26
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503, 503–18 (2006); Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Negligence as
Untaken Precaution, Limited Information and Efficient Standard Formation in the Civil Liability
System, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 15 (1997).
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discusses the resulting persistent data gap that litigation and regulation do not systematically address.
A. System Assumptions
Under the economic perspective, well-functioning free markets allocate scarce resources efficiently and maximize aggregate welfare.30
But at times, the market fails to do so, such as when it fails to account
for unpriced effects on third parties, referred to as externalities. The
idea is that if the market accounted for these effects, the welfare-maximizing equilibrium outcome would actually have been higher (positive externalities) or lower (negative externalities). While in some
contexts, decentralized bargaining between parties can ensure that all
such effects are internalized,31 these solutions are least likely in the
environmental context where there are often multiple victims of
exposures.32
In these scenarios, we rely on tort litigation and regulation to efficiently manage risks.33 Tort litigation offers coordination mechanisms
to reduce transaction costs, allowing plaintiffs to confront relevant defendants and get defendants to pay for revealed harms ex post. This
should force firms to internalize those harms and act in a socially optimal way in the first instance.34 Alternatively, regulators could force
firms to internalize expected harms through ex ante regulation by setting standards at socially optimal levels. Both systems have their advantages and their disadvantages in the environmental context.35
30. See generally VILFREDO PARETO, COURS D’ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE (1896).
31. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960).
32. See Menell, supra note 13, at 102–05 (describing various reasons environmental harms are
not likely to be adequately deterred outside of regulation). One reason transaction costs are high
in the environmental context is because there are often multiple potential victims of environmental harms. Another reason, the focus of this Article, is that the key information on causation
is sometimes unavailable and costly to discover.
33. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 368–71 (providing guidance for when regulation is more likely to provide for efficient
risk-management as compared to tort litigation); Richard A. Epstein, Federal Preemption, and
Federal Common Law, in Nuisance Cases, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 551, 557–58 (2008) (arguing generally that the need for regulation arises where transaction costs prevent adequate enforcement
through private nuisance actions).
34. See Shavell, supra note 33, at 366–68.
35. Id. The two ways of dealing with the negative environmental externality would be
equivalent, assuming that both estimate the same harms accurately. But compare Menell, supra
note 13, at 93 (discussing the ways tort litigation might systematically undervalue environmental
harms), with Butler, supra note 13, at 737–39 (describing how tort litigation can be more efficient
by providing opportunities to adjust to changes in technology, societal preferences, and experiential learning).
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In this Article, I focus on one specific problem that often arises in
this context: The problem of substantiating latent harms. In particular,
an innovative product or process might—or might not—have unintended harmful effects that are revealed much later. Because the
product or process is new, there is little information about potential
negative effects at its introduction. Do we wait some predetermined
time period to evaluate potential latent harms? Or do we learn about
them as we go?
Generally speaking, there are two ways to deal with new products
and processes and their unknown, possibly latent risks: Prohibit the
use of products and processes until they are proven safe or allow their
use and learn about the risks over time. The first option is embodied
in the precautionary principle, which states that those wanting to take
an action bear the burden of proving that the action does not create a
risk of harm to the public or the environment.36 Many European
countries have adopted the precautionary principle as a core riskmanagement strategy under some circumstances,37 and the European
Union has initiated programs to limit the availability of unstudied substances.38 In theory, this principle protects humans and the environment from the potential effects of such substances; it generally bars
their use unless proponents generate exonerating scientific evidence.
But following such a precautionary principle delays the introduction
of new and innovative products and processes, and such delays can
have negative consequences on human health and the environment.39
In his article criticizing a strong version of the precautionary principle,
Professor Cass Sunstein brings up the familiar example of “drug lag,”
the lag that results from delaying the introduction of new medicines
and drugs into the market.40 Sunstein warns, “If a government takes [a
36. The precautionary principle “allows the competent public authority to take, on a provisional basis, preventive protective measures on what is as yet an incomplete scientific basis,
pending the availability of additional scientific evidence.” Case T–13/99, Pfizer Animal Health
SA v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II–03305, ¶ 387.
37. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at 7–8
COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000) (recognizing “where there are indications that the possible
effects on the environment or human, animal or plant health may be potentially dangerous and
inconsistent with the chosen level of protection” and when at the same time the available data
precludes a detailed risk evaluation).
38. See Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),
(EC) No 1907/2006 as of 30 Dec. 2006, O.J. (L 396) (placing the burden of proof on firms to
identify and manage the risks linked to the substances they manufacture and market in the European Union).
39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1003 (2003) (arguing that the precautionary principle is actually paralyzing because all actions,
including inaction, create a risk to health or the environment).
40. Id. at 1023.
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precautionary] approach, it might protect people against harms from
inadequately tested drugs; but it will also prevent people from receiving potential benefits from those very drugs.”41 It is easy to imagine
similar concerns in the standard environmental context. While exposures to unstudied substances may prove harmful, this possibility must
be weighed against the benefits of using the new substances, among
other things.
For this reason, the United States generally adopts the other option:
We allow new products and processes until there is evidence that they
should be regulated.42 This approach recognizes that it is impossible to
analyze the tradeoffs and opportunity costs of prohibiting these innovations without more information. By allowing them, we reap the immediate benefits of the innovations—be they cheaper, faster, or
otherwise better for consumers. And by observing the use of these
innovations over time, we gather information about risks.43
The idea is that the interaction of tort, contract, and regulatory systems will address any important externalities as information on new
risks emerges over time as the innovative product or process is increasingly used. Tort litigation, in particular, has been regarded as
having an advantage over regulation in this regard. Scholars have argued that tort litigation provides a form of data collection about risks
that otherwise might not be evident at first, allowing standards to adjust over time.44
Or at least that is the theory. In practice, however, tort litigation
and regulation require threshold levels of scientific information on
causation to warrant action. But information on latent harms does not
emerge organically the way that information on immediate harms
might emerge over time. Scientific information on latent harms is expensive to generate, requiring thoughtful and targeted investigation
and analysis. The next Section discusses these challenges.
B. Practical Challenges
In order to generate reliable data on whether an exposure to a substance contributes to a particular harm, researchers need substantial
amounts of information on large groups of people over time. Analyzing the medical history or ordering the medical monitoring of one in41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2607(e) (West 2016) (no testing
requirements until threshold findings of harm).
43. This approach is reflected in Toxic Substances Control Act, discussed infra Part I.C.
44. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2068–70
(2000); Butler, supra note 13, at 737–39.
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dividual is unlikely to generate useful information about general or
specific causation in such cases. Researchers must identify the exposed population, collect biological and other information about the
extent of the exposure on a large enough sample of the population,
collect similar information for a control group, and tie the exposure to
outcomes. And they need to study large enough groups of people in
order to make it possible to find statistically significant results given
the baseline levels of risk and harm incidence and any confounding
factors. Collecting and analyzing such data is expensive, time-consuming, and difficult in most cases, but particularly so when harms are
latent.
When harm caused by a substance manifests itself immediately, it is
easier to collect and analyze data corroborating the link. Consider the
risk of dying on the job. The population of employees exposed to the
risk is well-defined within the particular industry, and employers have
long been required to report such fatalities to government agencies.45
This generates data that makes it possible to calculate detailed risks
for different occupations within an industry.46 And even without such
data, on-the-job fatalities tend to be visible, and workers are generally
aware of these risks.47 Because risk perceptions are more reliable, employees can make informed choices about occupations and
exposures.48
But when harms are latent, such as with most environmental harms,
it is much more difficult to collect and analyze data relevant to calculating risks.49 For one, the relevant exposed population might not be
easy to identify. People might move or switch jobs, and firms might
switch products or processes before harm manifests. The exposure
might occur in nonobvious ways or the harm might manifest itself differently in individuals. In addition, researchers must be able to control
for potentially contributing factors, such as lifestyle and environment.
The population might be exposed to other risks during the time it
takes for harm to manifest itself, or the baseline incidence of harm
might be high over such long periods of time. Or, the population
45. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, https://www.bls.gov/iif/
oshcfoi1.htm (last visited June 23, 2019).
46. Id.
47. See W. KIP VISCUSI, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER SOCIETY 13–15 (2018)
(summarizing research on economic and policy endeavors to establish a value of a statistical
life).
48. Id.
49. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, It’s About Time: The Long Overdue Demise of Statutes of
Repose in Latent Toxic Tort Litigation, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 23, 36–49 (2017) (describing
some of these challenges in more detail).
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might have underlying conditions or proclivities for which researchers
would need to control. In the case of some environmental exposures,
for example, the nearby population might be predominantly low-income or share some other characteristic.50 Large sample sizes allow
researchers to control for many confounding factors. Of course, collecting extensive medical, biological, and physical information on such
large groups of exposed and nonexposed individuals over time is expensive, time-consuming, and difficult.51
It is no surprise, then, that these studies typically cost millions of
dollars. It cost DuPont, for example, $20 million for the study examining the link between C-8 exposure and various harms. In that case, the
parties agreed to have three independent epidemiologists52 form a
“Science Panel” that would examine blood samples and medical histories from approximately 69,000 individuals exposed to drinking water
contaminated with C-8.53 The parties agreed that the Science Panel
would issue findings—either a “Probable Link Finding” or a “No
Probable Link Finding”—for each disease the Panel studied.54 In the
end, the Science Panel issued a Probable Link Finding for six diseases—kidney cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid disease, ulcerative colitis, high cholesterol, and pregnancy-induced hypertension and
preeclampsia—and it delivered No Probable Link Findings for the
rest of the alleged diseases.55 Although sampling and analysis technology is advancing rapidly, making studies more efficient, the cost of
epidemiological studies is likely to remain significant for the foreseeable future.56 And, unlike in DuPont’s case, defendants rarely fund
50. These types of concerns are also prevalent when analyzing the risks of pharmaceutical
drugs. In those cases, the population might have devastating or even terminal preconditions.
51. This is particularly true about the data collection component for both the researchers and
the participants. I have participated in these kinds of long-term epidemiological studies with
multiple follow-up data collection and interviews. In the last update for one of these studies, for
example, I was required to provide a blood and urine sample, perform various tasks, and participate in a long, in-person interview. The update took more than five hours.
52. In re E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig., No. 2:13-CV-170, 2016 WL
659112, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2016). The parties mutually agreed to select the following
experts: Tony Fletcher, Ph.D. of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, David
Savitz, Ph.D., M.S., of Brown University, and Kyle Steenland, Ph.D., Ph.D., M.S. of Emory University. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *1. Importantly, in addition to paying for the study, DuPont agreed not to contest
general causation in future actions that alleged an injury with a “Probable Link Finding.” Id. at
*3. It retained the right, however, to contest specific causation among other things. Id.
55. Id. at *3.
56. See Donald B. Myers Jr. & Paul A. Locke, Modernizing U.S. Chemicals Laws: How the
Application of Twenty-First Century Toxicology Can Help Drive Legal Reform, 20 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 35, 39 (2012) (documenting increasing efficiency); Warren Strauss et al., Improving
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epidemiological studies during litigation when there exists no reliable
evidence on causation.
C. Tort and Regulatory Limitations
The ability of tort litigation and regulation to effectively manage
potential latent harms from innovative products and processes is limited by the difficulties in generating important information on causation. This is true even for tort liability, which ordinarily has a
significant advantage over regulation in bringing to light information
on risks over time.
As an initial matter, it is true that juries have sometimes imposed
liability on defendants for new products or processes based on weak
(or nonexistent) scientific evidence on causation. For example, after a
prominent tort case in which the plaintiff alleged latent harms from
her silicone breast implants, two jurors indicated after the decision
that they did not think that silicone caused the plaintiff’s disease.57
Despite this, the jury awarded her $5.2 million in compensation because she was sick, she needed the money, and there was no evidence
that silicone was safe.58 Litigation about the potential harms of
Bendectin, a morning-sickness pill prescribed to pregnant women, and
other drugs also resulted in large jury awards despite little information
about causation.59 There are questions about whether current litigation on the effects of Roundup, a weed-killer produced by Monsanto,
is justified based on the available scientific evidence.60
Cost-Effectiveness of Epidemiological Studies Via Designed Missingness Strategies, 29 STAT MED.
1377–87 (2010) (proposing one way to lower costs, though the case studies still cost millions).
57. See Joni Hersch, Breast Implants: Regulation, Litigation, and Science, in REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION 142, 142 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). In fact, two courts relied on expert
panels to evaluate the complex causal issues. See generally Laural L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil &
Thomas E. Willging, Neutral Science Panels: Two Examples of Panels of Court-Appointed Experts in the Breast Implants Product Liability Litigation, FED. JUD. CTR. (2000), https://www.fjc
.gov/sites/default/files/2012/NeuSciPa.pdf.
58. See Hersch, supra note 57.
59. Jane E. Brody, Shadow of Doubt Wipes Out Bendectin, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 1983), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/1983/06/19/weekinreview/shadow-of-doubt-wipes-out-bendectin.html.
60. See, e.g., Randazzo, supra note 18. Monsanto’s actions in suppressing scientific information appeared to play a role in the litigation. In upholding punitive damages, California Superior
Court Judge Winifred Smith found that “Monsanto made efforts to impede, discourage, or distort the underlying scientific inquiry.” Amanda Bronstad, Judge Who Reduced $2B Roundup
Verdict Said Monsanto Manipulated the Science, LAW.COM (July 26, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://www
.law.com/therecorder/2019/07/26/judge-who-reduced-2b-roundup-verdict-said-monsanto-manipu
lated-the-science/; see also Michael Hiltzik, Column: Did a Jury Ignore Science When It Hit Monsanto with a $2-Billion Verdict?, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2019 6:20 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-monsanto-glyphosate-verdict-20190517-story.html.
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Some of these examples demonstrate how tort litigation can get
things very wrong when it allows liability without sufficient evidence
on causation. But tort law’s mistakes are only evident because the
large damage awards motivated subsequent research to get at the
truth. For example, consider again the case of silicone breast implants.
Only after numerous plaintiffs had won multimillion-dollar awards
through tort litigation did the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
require implant manufacturers to provide information on the longterm safety of implants and initiate studies evaluating links between
implants and adverse outcomes.61 Bendectin has also since been vindicated by multiple epidemiological studies,62 and a version of it has
reentered the market.63 It remains to be seen whether Roundup, too,
will be vindicated with additional research into its risks.
In this way, large and unpredictable tort awards can help generate
evidence that will eventually move us closer to the socially optimal
activity and risk level for innovative products and processes. But this
data generation that emerges through tort law’s mistakes is inconsistent and costly. For example, in the case of Bendectin, the lawsuits
caused the pill to be pulled from the market, which was costly not only
to the manufacturer but also to society as well; scholars have found
adverse consequences on pregnant woman, such as increased nausearelated hospitalizations.64 There have also been claims that the lawsuits made drug firms wary of offering drugs aimed at pregnant
women in general given the higher probability of large damages despite weak evidence of causation.65
Thus, unwarranted damage awards have unintended negative consequences (over-deterring the introduction of innovative products and
processes and normalizing unsupported findings on causation by
courts), but they also have unintended positive consequences (motivating data generation on causation). The negative consequences have
received more attention, spurring tort reforms. Importantly, courts
61. Hersch, supra note 57.
62. See, e.g., PM McKeigue et al., Bendectin and Birth Defects: I. A Meta-Analysis of the Epidemiologic Studies, 50 TERATOLOGY 27, 27 (1994); Robert L. Brent, Bendectin: Review of the
Medical Literature of a Comprehensively Studied Human Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent
Tortogen-Litigen, 9 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 337, 337 (1995).
63. Its new trademark name is Diclegis. See Robert Lowes, FDA Approves Diclegis as First
Morning Sickness Drug in 30 Years, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.med
scape.com/viewarticle/782212.
64. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Kutcher et al., Bendectin and Birth Defects II: Ecological Analyses, 67
BIRTH DEFECTS RES. 88 (2003).
65. D.A. Wing, B. Powers & D. Hickok, U.S. Food and Drug Administration Drug Approval:
Slow Advances in Obstetric Care in the United States, 115 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 825,
825–33 (2010).
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have tried to limit such unwarranted damages going forward by adopting less permissive approaches to the kinds of expert testimony that
would support causation. At the same time, courts also started employing more stringent controls on class certification.
In federal courts, for example, the famous case Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals set a new, more demanding standard for admitting expert testimony.66 Judges were to be gatekeepers, assessing
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”67 Other jurisdictions
have followed suit in adopting this standard.68 The effect of the
Daubert standard was almost immediate; soon after its adoption, Professor David Bernstein observed that “most federal courts are interpreting Daubert as giving them wide authority to restrict the scope of
admissible scientific evidence in toxic tort litigation and are using that
authority aggressively.”69 Even when a case is allowed to go to a jury,
courts are more willing to reduce large awards when they determine
that insufficient reliable evidence had been presented during the
proceedings.70
Similarly, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA)71 to combat perceived abuses by plaintiffs’ attorneys in
66. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
67. Id. at 592–93.
68. See generally John M. Conley & Scott W. Gaylord, Scientific Evidence in the State Courts:
Daubert and the Problem of Outcomes, 44 JUDGES’ J. 6, 7 (2005) (discussing several states’ adoption or adaptation of Daubert and listing cases that demonstrate each state’s approach to scientific evidence).
69. David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2139 (1994); see also Kevin Hannon, Representing Plaintiffs in Toxic Tort Litigation, 26 COLO. LAW. 56 (1997) (arguing that Daubert created
a second burden of proof for plaintiffs, making cases more expensive); Anthony Z. Roisman,
Martha L. Judy & Daniel Stein, Preserving Justice: Defending Toxic Tort Litigation, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 204 (2004) (arguing that judges acting as “gatekeeper[s]” often resulted in plaintiffs being unable to use scientific evidence on which they could previously rely);
Craig T. Smith, Peering into the Microscope: The Rise of Judicial Gatekeeping after Daubert and
Its Effect on Federal Toxic Tort Litigation, 13 B.U. J. OF SCI. & TECH. L. 218, 220 (2007) (finding
that courts became more active in determining the admissibility of expert testimony and arguing
for greater acceptability of probabilistic evidence on causation). That said, some have argued
that Daubert made it easier for plaintiffs to allege novel theories of causation. See, e.g., Wendy S.
Neal, General Electric Co. v. Joiner: The Future of Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation,
67 U. CIN. L. REV. 881, 901 (1998).
70. See, e.g., Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-CV-2284, 2017 WL 1196510, at *1–2
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2017) (vacating a jury award of $4.24 million for damages relating to fracking-related water contamination and ordering a new trial after determining that the evidence was
insufficient to support that award).
71. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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bringing class-action lawsuits in plaintiff-friendly state courts. This led
to these lawsuits either being brought in or being removed to federal
courts.72 Because many environmental exposures affect large groups
of individuals, class certification was an important source of leverage
for these plaintiffs. For example, in the DuPont case, class certification
was the pivotal moment in the litigation that led DuPont to agree to
fund the analysis on causation.73 A state district court had certified the
group of thousands of nearby residents as a class under Rules
23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) despite the fact that the group’s members
alleged different exposures and a variety of injuries.74 At least in economic terms, DuPont faced a choice between continuing to litigate
against the large class of plaintiffs alleging a variety of injuries in a
plaintiff-friendly state court and funding a study that had the potential
to (and did) drastically reduce the number and variation of eventual
claims. And even though the Science Panel’s findings would not bind
non-class members, the reliable evidence on causation that it produced would be persuasive in any future litigation involving residents
around its other plants.
That kind of leverage—the certified class action—is now much
harder to come by due to CAFA. DuPont, for example, used CAFA to
remove future lawsuits pertaining to C-8 exposure to federal courts.75
And federal courts were not open to certifying the diverse plaintiffs’
classes, especially when the plaintiffs presented claims for medical
monitoring, leading to the abandonment of these claims.76 One federal court, for example, refused to certify a class in the DuPont litigation because it held that the plaintiffs failed to show on a class-wide
basis that they each faced significant exposures to C-8 that significantly increased their risk of contracting a qualifying disease.77
72. For a more thorough history of how CAFA generally has led to the decay of state courts,
see Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86. U. CHI. L. REV.
2101 (2019).
73. See Hall, Iles & Morello-Frosch, supra note 1, at 21–22 (citing the rush of bad publicity
and the particular forum, a plaintiff-friendly state court).
74. Leach v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 01-C-608, 2002 WL 1270121, at *18 (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002).
75. Id.; see Hall, Iles & Morello-Frosch, supra note 1, at 21–22.
76. Leach, 2002 WL 1270121, at *18. Without class certification, the plaintiffs pursued lowervalue property claims, such as claims for trespass. See Hall, Iles & Morello-Frosch, supra note 1,
at 21–22.
77. See Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 253 F.R.D. 365, 367 (S.D. W. Va. 2008)
(“The plaintiffs have presented compelling evidence that exposure to C-8 may be harmful to
human health, and the evidence certainly justifies the concerns expressed by the plaintiffs in this
case. . . . The fact that a public health risk may exist is more than enough to raise concern in the
community and call government agencies to action, but it does not show the common individual
injuries needed to certify a class action.”).
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Thus, tort litigation fails to systematically generate useful information on latent harms. At times, it allows juries to take shots in the
dark, especially if there is evidence that the defendant contributed to
the lack of available scientific information on harms.78 Whenever
these shots in the dark result in large damage awards, tort litigation
might motivate further research on causation. But this unpredictable
approach to dealing with a lack of reliable scientific evidence produces huge social costs, limiting the availability of often beneficial
products and processes and normalizing unsupported findings on causation by courts. Bad science in courts is unlikely to be the answer. A
shift to requiring more reliable scientific evidence and a more consistent approach to the certification of class actions undoubtedly produces benefits. But the emerging approach produces unintended costs,
too. In particular, it reduces the probability of damage awards in cases
of exposures that are not well-studied, thereby reducing the subsequent generation of scientific evidence. In other words, there is less
opportunity for tort litigation to generate a shock to the system and
attract funding to scientific study of underlying causation.
The inability of tort litigation to systematically generate useful scientific information on latent harms would not be concerning if there
were sufficient other incentives for generating this information.79
There is reason, however, to think that there are not.
As an initial matter, it might seem reasonable to expect plaintiffs to
generate the required scientific data prior to litigation if such data is
increasingly required. But there are at least three hurdles that plaintiffs face in doing so. First, the reliability of the information is greatest
when a large number of potential victims (and control groups) can be
evaluated or monitored. This presents a difficult and costly coordination problem. After litigation commences, plaintiffs could use vehicles
such as class actions to help solve this coordination problem. But
again, such certification is increasingly unlikely without existing scientific evidence. Second, plaintiffs will often not have sufficient knowledge about substances and exposures to generate reliable information
on their own. In particular, without the defendant’s cooperation,
plaintiffs would lack critical information on type, intensity, and duration of exposure, and this information could help with accurately as78. See, e.g., Bronstad, supra note 60 (reporting that the trial judge upheld punitive damages
in the Roundup case because “Monsanto made efforts to impede, discourage, or distort the
underlying scientific inquiry”).
79. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 557–58 (arguing that the need for regulation arises where
transaction costs prevent adequate enforcement through private nuisance actions).
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sessing exposure and linking it to outcomes.80 And third, this
information is costly to generate but, once generated, it can be used
by any future plaintiffs and regulators. Scientific information on the
existence or nonexistence of a link between exposure and outcomes is
a pure public good: non-rivalrous and nonexcludable. For potential
plaintiffs, then, there are strong incentives not to contribute to generating this information, especially because sometimes it will demonstrate that there is no link between exposure and alleged harms; it is
rational to free ride on the information if it proves helpful after it has
already been generated by someone else.
There is a growing industry that finances litigation.81 This industry
has enormous resources and could pay for studies if the expected return is sufficiently high. In such cases, a third-party funder could overcome the first hurdle, coordinating and paying for the expensive
studies. But in order to maximize the reliability of the results, the
funder would still have to obtain the necessary exposure information
controlled by the defendant. And finally, the fact that this information
can cut both ways and becomes publicly available further depresses
the likelihood of initiating the studies based only on the benefits that
accrue to the eventual plaintiffs (and their funders). Toxic tort cases
are already expensive and difficult to prove.
Although information about the risks of new products and
processes is often generated through scientific studies carried out by
firms in the relevant industry, such studies are most likely to be conducted in response to potential tort or regulatory liability. Again, tort
litigation is unlikely to systematically apply pressure for extensive epidemiological analysis.
Similarly, without key information on risk, regulation likely cannot
be initiated either.82 TSCA recognizes that “adequate information
should be developed with respect to the effect of chemical substances
and mixtures on health and the environment,” and it expresses the
view “that the development of such information should be the responsibility of those who manufacture and those who process such chemical substances and mixtures.”83 But before the EPA is allowed to
regulate industrial substances under TSCA, it must first find that the
substances pose an “unreasonable risk of injury to health or to the
80. See Hersch, supra note 57, at 142.
81. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party Financing of Class Action Litigation in the
United States: Will the Sky Fall?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (2014) (discussing third-party financing
and its potential expansion to class action litigation).
82. And, if initiated, it would be unlikely to improve social welfare given the significant risk of
over or under regulation.
83. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601(b)(1) (West 2016).
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environment.”84 This threshold finding must be supported by “substantial evidence,” which would be difficult for the agency to prove
absent reliable scientific information.85 In addition, regulation generally fails to provide incentives for creating this information. Again,
although TSCA imposes some reporting requirements on manufacturers, those requirements have historically been triggered when information “reasonably supports the conclusion that” a substance
“presents a substantial risk of injury to health.”86 Of the more than
80,000 substances on the TSCA inventory, the EPA has only required
approximately 200 of these to be tested, producing very little data on
potential health and environmental impacts.87 Accordingly, the EPA
has used the TSCA to regulate the production of only five substances
since its enactment.88 In 2016, Congress adopted the Frank R.
Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, which amended
TSCA to address some of its perceived failures.89 As relevant here,
the amendment provides for additional authority for the EPA to require testing if it needs information for risk evaluation or other regulatory ends,90 but it is unclear whether and how the EPA will use this
authority to combat the long list of unstudied substances.91
Like the limits on tort litigation, the limits on federal regulation
make sense, too. For regulation to be welfare maximizing, regulators
84. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(a) (West 2016) (“If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable
basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of
a chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities, presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, the Administrator shall by rule apply one or
more of the following requirements to such substance or mixture to the extent necessary to
protect adequately against such risk using the least burdensome requirements.”). Previously, the
agency also had to show that its proposed regulation was the “least burdensome” way to address
the unreasonable risk. Congress has since removed this requirement, but it kept the requirement
that the agency consider the costs and benefits of any regulation. See generally Frank R.
Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114–182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2601).
85. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that
the agency did not meet this standard when it sought to ban lead under TSCA).
86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2607(e) (West 2016).
87. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 24.
88. Id. Congress passed The Lautenberg Act to urge EPA to go through substances more
quickly, but the requirement of substantial evidence and cost-benefit analysis remains to ensure
that EPA does not overreach.
89. See Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114–182,
130 Stat. 448 (2016) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2601).
90. Id. § 4.
91. For one thing, the Act specifically does not allow the EPA to use this additional authority
“for the purposes of establishing or implementing a minimum information requirement of
broader applicability.” See id.
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need extensive information on the costs and benefits of regulating.92
The idea, then, is to focus on known and verifiable risks—and promote innovative products and processes quickly.93 Otherwise, regulation could be used too often, resulting in unintended consequences,
such as the use of worse substitutes or less innovation.94 This is sensible as long as information is generated by someone over time—allowing a regulatory agency to rationally update its regulations in light
of new information. But if no one is monitoring and recording useful
information on exposures and harms, then there cannot be efficient
updating.95
Our system of insurance also plays a role in risk mitigation.96 Insurers could potentially monitor and produce relevant information on
harms, but they too are unlikely to do so. Health insurers have incentives to lower risks and could deploy monitoring to potentially identify
links that are geographically based. But insurers that cover potential
victims are unlikely to have comprehensive coverage for all exposed
victims and unlikely to coordinate with other insurers to figure out
complex correlations.97 And moreover, the insurers will not have ac92. See, e.g., Al McGartland et al., Estimating the Health Benefits of Environmental Regulations: Changes Needed for Complete Benefits Assessment, 357 SCIENCE 457, 457–58 (2017)
(describing how “health effects with less-certain evidence” or without a clear summary statement of the strength of the evidence are usually excluded from benefits analysis).
93. Some regulation might be more precautionary, but even then, the trigger is some threshold judgment about existing risks. Even in the European Union, where the precautionary principle is explicitly recognized, the principle has been accepted as a risk-management strategy to
deal with cases “when there are reasonable grounds for concern that potential hazards may
affect the environment or human, animal or plant health, and when at the same time the available data preclude a detailed risk evaluation.” Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at 8 COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000).
94. See e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1220–21 (5th Cir. 1991) (expressing concern that an outright ban in TSCA could lead to decreased innovation and no viable
substitutes).
95. In other work, I have argued that a commitment to regulation justified by cost-benefit
analysis should motivate research that could be used to rationally modify regulation if needed.
See Caroline Cecot, Deregulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Stability, 68 DUKE L.J.
1593, 1617 (2019). This Article does a deep dive into whether current risk-management systems
in fact provide sufficient incentives for generating this information.
96. Premiums are often tagged to regulatory compliance, and the insurer, seeking to minimize
risk, monitors compliance with premium conditions and may help develop and implement riskmitigation schemes. See, e.g., ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY HIGHLIGHTS 1, 14, 19–20 (2017). At least one empirical study has demonstrated how insurance,
through risk-based pricing and monitoring, could improve environmental outcomes. See Haitao
Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew W. White, Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort:
Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 325,
341–42 (2011).
97. Insurance would, however, provide compensation to victims. This is why I focus on using
tort litigation primarily to address optimal deterrence and not compensation; insurance is a
cheaper way of providing compensation.
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cess to relevant company information. Company liability insurers,
meanwhile, would have no risk information on which to base their
premiums in this context and no access to information on harms that
could shed light on any links.
Advances in technology have made some tools of measuring, monitoring, and analyzing health data available to citizens,98 making it possible for them to play a role in producing valuable data about risks.
There are concerns, however, about the quality of the information
that untrained citizens would produce and whether such efforts would
be sufficient.99 Recent research confirms that current citizen efforts
have resulted in producing data of varying quality, especially when not
supervised by independent researchers.100
Thus, we predominantly rely on independent researchers to produce this information with funding from governments and charitable
funds. The information is unlikely to be systematically or comprehensively funded, generated, or analyzed. Researchers face pressures to
focus on statistically significant results, which hinders the dissemination of useful information on non-harms and affects the choice of substances and populations to study. Such expensive studies are not
undertaken at random, but they are chosen carefully based on some
set of considerations. Researchers also face difficulties without substantial cooperation from both potential victims and alleged injurers.
In addition to measuring exposures and understanding their pathways,
researchers would need significant medical and geographical information. Of course, when researchers are able to do this, the information
generated has been valuable. The epidemiological studies on the effects of fine particulate matter,101 exposure to the World Trade Center
disaster,102 and extensive fracking,103 to name just a few, have gener98. George Wyeth et al., The Impact of Citizen Environmental Science in the United States, 49
ENVTL. L. REP. 10237, 10237 (2019).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in
Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (1993). The study has helped monetize the benefits
of reducing particulate matter, and these benefits constitute one of the largest categories of benefits of recent environmental regulations. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES
ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 6 (2007) (finding that the largest estimated benefit was
from reduction in air pollution from fine particulate matter).
102. See, e.g., N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, World Trade Center (WTC) Health Studies and Information on Health Services (May 2017), https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/investigations/
wtc/health_studies/responders.htm; WORLD TRADE CTR. HEALTH PROGRAMS, Research
Projects, https://wwwn.cdc.gov/ResearchGateway/ResearchProjects (last visited June 23, 2019).
103. See, e.g., JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, Study: Fracking Industry
Wells Associated with Increased Risk of Asthma Attacks (July 18, 2016), https://www.jhsph.edu/
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ated, and will continue to generate, useful information on underlying
risks of products and processes that could be used in litigation and
regulation. But relying solely on this option is inadequate. Insufficient
funding for research is a concern, as demonstrated by the struggle for
continued funding for long-term monitoring and health funds that
have been established after large public disasters, such as the World
Trade Center Registry and Health Program.104 The inadequacy of current research efforts is underscored by the sheer number of unstudied
substances on the TSCA inventory.
In short, we generally allow innovative products and processes on
the market, but we provide few incentives for testing them or monitoring their use over time. Neither potential plaintiffs, regulators, independent researchers, nor insurers are likely to systematically
monitor and analyze the potential harms of new substances. In fact, as
tort law reform has led to better scientific gatekeeping, incentives for
generating data on harms have, in some cases, gone down; plaintiffs
generally cannot overcome the significant hurdles to generating the
data on their own, and there are less shock judgments that could motivate subsequent research by others. Independent research, with the
limited funding that is available, cannot adequately fill this gap.
Reducing this persistent data gap is important. The effectiveness of
current options for promoting socially optimal behavior hinges on the
availability of reliable scientific data on latent harms. A persistent
data gap results in enduring deviations from welfare-maximizing outcomes in the environmental context: Firms face inadequate incentives
to study the effects of such substances beforehand and alter their behavior in order to mitigate potential risks. As has been noted in the
context of corporate financial governance, “you manage what you
measure.”105 There is a need for promoting systematic production of
information about unknown harms from unstudied substances.106 This
Article explores ways to promote the generation of this information
through changes to common law and regulatory law.

news/news-releases/2016/study-fracking-industry-wells-associated-with-increased-risk-of-asthmaattacks.html.
104. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-1020T, SEPTEMBER 11: MONITORING OF WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH EFFECTS HAS PROGRESSED, BUT NOT FOR FEDERAL RESPONDERS (2005).
105. Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342–43 (1996).
106. Once the information is generated, current systems kick in to incentivize firms to internalize harms.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL208.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 23

THE DATA GAP

21-APR-20

11:52

319

II. TORT WAYS FORWARD
Because tort law traditionally played a beneficial role in providing
data on unintended consequences of new products and processes, this
Article first turns to the ways that tort law can play this role in the
context of latent harms from environmental exposures without sacrificing its commitment to science-based results. I argue that insufficient
scientific information on causation should not be a bar to some tort
litigation; instead, tort litigation should adopt unique forms that can
promote the development of this useful information.
The history of tort law is characterized by expanding forms of liability and types of remedies as knowledge, social norms, and expectations evolve over time. Recently, many courts have been open to
causes of action or remedies for medical monitoring,107 and scholars
have long argued for potential causes of action for the increased risk
of future harms.108 Both developments have emerged at least in part
as a response to the growing concern with exposures to substances
that result in latent harms.109 But neither medical monitoring nor increased-risk claims get at the underlying concern in this Article. In
particular, both require some threshold level of risk and, for the increased-risk claims, substantial knowledge of the likelihood, magnitude, and distribution of eventual harms. This Part focuses on ways
tort could promote generation of data where none exists, such as by
shifting the burden for causation and ordering informational monitoring in certain contexts.
A. Burden-Shifting Approach to Causation
One way that tort law could promote information generation is by
shifting the burden for proving causation to the defendant after some
showing by the plaintiff.110 Limited burden-shifting schemes can en107. E.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 816 (Cal. 1993); Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Albright, 71 A.3d 30, 81–82 (Md. 2013); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d
970, 976 (Utah 1993). Consider also well-established expansions meant to address real, though
intangible, harms, such as the early development of liability for assault and, more recently, bystander liability. E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S., At the
Assizes, 1348 Year Book, Liber Assisarum, folio 99, placitum 60.
108. See, e.g., Kristen Chapin, Toxic Torts, Public Health Data, and the Evolving Common
Law: Compensation for Increased Risk of Future Injury, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L.
129, 132 (1993).
109. E.g., Recent Cases, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Recognizes Cause of Action
for Medical Monitoring of Tobacco Users, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1771 (2010) (arguing that
relief in the form of medical monitoring has developed in response to “a world in which people
regularly encounter environmental toxins, the effects of which are largely unknown”).
110. A more radical option is to get rid of the requirement that a plaintiff prove general
causation. But see Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards A New

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL208.txt

320

unknown

Seq: 24

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

21-APR-20

11:52

[Vol. 69:297

sure that parties that are in the best position to acquire information
are incentivized to do so. Sometimes such a burden-shifting requirement can come from state or federal law. For example, Pennsylvania
law requires drilling operators to provide baseline test results of
nearby water sources if they want to allege preexisting contamination
in litigation.111 Operators that fail to test water prior to drilling would
be presumptively liable for any contamination—thereby decreasing
some of the difficulties plaintiffs have in proving causation. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal anti-discrimination statute,
provides one of the most known versions of a burden-shifting framework in the context of demonstrating workplace racial discrimination.112 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment outcome.113
Occasionally, a burden-shifting requirement emerges in the common law. In Zuchowicz v. United States,114 for example, the issue was
whether the excessive dosage of an admittedly risky pharmaceutical
drug—for which even the permitted dose might be dangerous—
caused the plaintiff’s harm. Writing for the court, Judge Guido Calabresi held that under Connecticut law there was sufficient evidence of
causation once the plaintiff showed that the drug could cause the
harm and that the defendants administered an amount in excess of
FDA and company guidelines.115 He analogized the situation to cases
in which a defendant’s violation of some safety standard increased the
probability of a harm to the plaintiff that in fact occurred.116 This was
sufficient to show causation unless the negligent party demonstrated
that there was some other cause.117
On the one hand, a burden-shifting scheme seems even more justified in the case of toxic torts, where plaintiffs are often exposed to
potentially harmful substances without their knowledge or consent
and without gaining any benefits to themselves. In this context, with
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2118–19 (1997) (arguing that while
this option would allow plaintiffs to recover damages in many cases, it would not generate useful
information and would not promote optimal deterrence).
111. Jon Hurdle, Science Panel Faults EPA Fracking Probe for Excluding Baseline Water Testing, STATEIMPACT PA. (Jan. 13, 2016, 6:06 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2016/01/
13/science-panel-faults-epa-fracking-probe-for-excluding-baseline-water-testing/.
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e) (West 2016).
113. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
114. 140 F.3d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 390–92. In this case, the plaintiff was generally made aware of the risks of the drug
at the proper dosage.
116. Id. at 391.
117. Id.
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no scientific data on latent harms, the threshold inquiry would have to
be the plaintiff’s exposure to a significant amount of the substance.
The defendant would then produce studies showing that the substance
did not produce the plaintiff’s harm or be held liable for the plaintiff’s
harm.
On the other hand, applying a burden-shifting framework when
there is no scientific evidence on causation is a significantly more radical proposition than the burden-shifting framework the court applied
in Zuchowicz. In that case, the court still required the plaintiff to
make the threshold showing that the drug could cause the harm
(whether the excess dose or not).118 This threshold showing—that the
drug could cause the harm and did, in some way, cause the harm—was
important to the court’s analysis, and it limited the burden-shifting
framework to the issue of whether the negligent, excess dose caused
the plaintiff’s harm as opposed to the allowable, non-negligent dose.
In fact, the court explicitly distinguished the situation from the toxic
tort context, where a long latency period could make it difficult for the
plaintiff to establish general causation.119 Of course, the persistent
lack of this kind of information in the toxic tort context is exactly the
focus of this Article.
A complete, exposure-based burden-shifting approach would produce a variety of responses. Some firms might delay using innovative
products and processes until they complete the required long-term
testing on harms. This response would create significant delay, denying many users the benefits of the products and processes. Other firms
might choose not to produce the data beforehand. They might instead
choose to engage in monitoring, hoping that they acquire sufficient
information to defeat causation by the time any litigation commences.
Of course, this approach risks a costly damage award in the meantime.
118. Id. at 390–91 (“Where such a strong causal link exists, it is up to the negligent party to
bring in evidence denying but for cause and suggesting that in the actual case the wrongful
conduct had not been a substantial factor. . . . It follows that when a negative side effect is
demonstrated to be the result of a drug, and the drug was wrongly prescribed in an unapproved
and excessive dosage (i.e. a strong causal link has been shown), the plaintiff who is injured has
generally shown enough to permit the finder of fact to conclude that the excessive dosage was a
substantial factor in producing the harm.”).
119. The court recognized the additional difficulties in the toxic tort context, suggesting that
the medical expert testimony about whether the drug could have caused the harm might be
insufficient in more complicated contexts involving latent harms. See id. at 390 (“In this respect,
we note that in the case before us, unlike many toxic torts situations, there was not a long latency
period between the onset of symptoms and the patient’s exposure to the drug that was alleged to
have caused the illness. Rather, as Dr. Matthay testified, the plaintiff began exhibiting symptoms
typical of drug-induced PPH shortly after she started taking the Danocrine. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the fact finder was clearly erroneous in determining that, more probably than not, the Danocrine caused Mrs. Zuchowicz’s illness.”).
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But industry and academic researchers would have incentives to generate and analyze information on harms because juries would award
plaintiffs compensation for their injuries.
This option might be better than allowing weak evidence to satisfy
the plaintiff’s burden of proving causation, but it might not be an improvement over the status quo that requires the plaintiff to provide
reliable evidence on causation. It would be better than allowing plaintiffs to collect damages based on weak scientific evidence because at
least under the burden-shifting framework, damages would be
awarded on the recognition that there is, currently, insufficient evidence on harms. The cases would provide explicit incentives to generate reliable scientific information that, once generated, would stem
further litigation. It is not much better than damages based on weak
science, and possibly worse than the status quo prohibiting damages
outright, because it would open the floodgates to litigation alleging a
seemingly endless variety of harms in light of exposure, and it would
be difficult for studies to rule out all potential allegations of harm. In
the short term, many plaintiffs would get windfall damages. And, in all
likelihood, many unstudied substances would eventually be proven to
be relatively harmless.
One potential limit to the burden-shifting framework would be to
provide a safe harbor when the defendant has put in place a monitoring system to evaluate any potential harms over time, as long as the
defendant shares the results of its ongoing analysis. Courts would have
to determine whether the system is sufficiently comprehensive to evaluate the kinds of harms alleged by the plaintiff. The effect of this more
limited burden-shifting approach, which would only shift the burden
on causation when a defendant has not undertaken any long-term
analysis of potential harms to exposed populations, would be similar
to the effect of the direct approach discussed in the next Section.
B. Court-Ordered Informational Monitoring
Another approach would be for courts to directly order the information monitoring and analysis required to evaluate the ongoing concerns about the safety of new products and processes as they are
raised by litigants. In this Section, I consider two options for tort law
to do so under some circumstances.
1. Collateral Monitoring
One option is to allow a court to order a defendant to fund informational monitoring as part of the damages for exposure-based causes of
action, such as trespass. This option is analogous to the Tonawanda
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Coke Corporation case.120 For years, Tonawanda Coke produced
coke, a coal-derived fuel, in its plant located in Tonawanda, New
York.121 Concerned about the visible pollution emanating from the
plant and a perceived high incidence of cancers, several community
members began testing the air with handmade kits to understand the
effect of the Tonawanda Coke’s operations.122 These activities got the
attention of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, which began its own study of air quality in the area around
the plant.123 The agency’s study revealed that the plant was emitting
benzene, a known carcinogen regulated under the Clean Air Act, at
levels more than seventy-five times higher than permitted.124 In the
end, the EPA brought an enforcement action against Tonawanda
Coke, and the company was found criminally liable for violating several provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act.125 As part of its sentence, Tonawanda Coke was
required to provide a specific kind of community service.126 It was
required to fund two studies—a $711,000 soil study and a $11.4 million
health study—that would help evaluate the effects of Tonawanda’s environmental violations on the community.127 Researchers from the
University of Buffalo were to lead the studies.
In this case, the district court determined that the harm suffered by
the community included the uncertainty surrounding the increased
risk of contracting future illnesses related to Tonawanda Coke’s violations. The court related this harm to situations in which courts have
recognized a reasonable threat of environmental harm as a cognizable
120. See United States v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., 5 F. Supp. 3d 343 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); Jerving,
supra note 23.
121. See U.S. EPA, Tonawanda Coke Corporation (TCC) Site, https://www.epa.gov/ny/tona
wanda-coke-corporation-tcc-site (last visited April 2019).
122. Tonawanda, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 347.
123. Id.
124. Id.; Jerving, supra note 23. Martyn T. Smith, Advances in Understanding Benzene Health
Effects and Susceptibility, 31 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 133, 134–36 (2010) (describing evidence
of benzene’s role in increasing likelihood of cancers).
125. Tonawanda, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 351–52. The company’s environmental control manager,
Mark Kamholz, was sentenced to one year in prison. Id. at 352.
126. The federal sentencing guidelines allow the imposition of community service as a condition of probation “where such community service is reasonably designed to repair the harm
caused by the offense.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
127. See United States v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., 5 F. Supp. 3d 343, 347 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)
(requiring company to conduct evaluative projects recommended by community as condition of
its probationary sentence for violating environmental requirements). The soil study has been
completed, with some preliminary results. See Jerving, supra note 23.
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harm.128 Moreover, at least one of the key pollutants—benzene—was
known to affect human health; the uncertainty stemmed from the “difficulty in understanding, not to mention quantifying, that potential
harm.”129 Therefore, as a requirement of Tonawanda’s probation, the
court ordered the company “to help community members understand
the effects—or lack thereof—of the pollutants to which they have
been exposed” by funding the two informational studies.130
In other words, Tonawanda Coke was ordered to fund these studies
as part of the company’s sentence for its criminal violations of federal
statutes. I call this “collateral monitoring.” Key to this case, benzene
was already regulated under federal environmental statutes.131 And,
the company’s particularly egregious violations of these statutes,
which greatly increased plaintiffs’ exposure, gave the court license to
fashion a unique remedy that also generated valuable information.
Like DuPont’s funding of the epidemiological studies on exposure to
C-8, these studies have the potential to increase information about
benzene exposure.132
Courts should order such collateral monitoring more often and regularly include this type of “community service” when fashioning
sentences for criminal violations that involve large-scale population
exposure to regulated substances. But such court-ordered collateral
monitoring is limited when tied to criminal behavior; such egregious
violations of federal environmental statutes are rare. Moreover, this
kind of violation-based informational remedy would not be available
for exposures to unregulated (and unstudied) substances, for which
risk information would be most valuable.
A remedy of informational monitoring would have a far greater impact if it could be tied to a tort like trespass that results in exposure to
an unstudied substance instead of tied to criminal liability. The next
Section proposes the equivalent of such broad collateral monitoring,
128. Tonawanda, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 361–63 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92
F.3d 1228, 1234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir.
1993); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957, 963 (D. Or. 2006)).
129. Tonawanda, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 362–63.
130. Id. at 363.
131. The district court noted that the fact that the pollutant is regulated lends support to the
view that the community’s concerns are reasonable. Id. at 362 (“Further, the enactment by Congress of laws governing emissions and other contaminants, and the participation by the United
States in related international agreements, also weigh against any suggestion that the threatened
harm is entirely chimerical.”) (internal quotations omitted).
132. In fact, one of Tonawanda Coke’s challenges to this aspect of its sentence was that it
forces the company to basically generate “incriminating” evidence against itself by monitoring
the nearby population and helping to establish evidence of specific causation.
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framed as a stand-alone tort cause of action instead of as an equitable
remedy to the defendant’s tortious conduct in exposing the plaintiff to
the substance.133
2. A New Tort Cause of Action for Monitoring
Another option is for the common law to develop an explicit cause
of action for informational monitoring and analysis exactly when little
is known about the eventual harms, subject to appropriate limitations.
This idea is not so far-fetched. This cause of action would be, in some
ways, similar to a cause of action (or equitable remedy) for medical
monitoring. Medical monitoring emerged to solve a perceived problem in addressing and mitigating likely future harms when we know
that exposure significantly increases their likelihood of manifesting. A
claim for informational monitoring or analysis could emerge to solve a
related but distinct problem of generating information on causation
when no information is currently available.134 Of course, it would not
be justified by its role in promoting diagnosis or mitigation as medical
monitoring is justified; it would be justified by its role in increasing
our knowledge of harms and causation.135 In other words, instead of
demonstrating that risk mitigation would be worthwhile,136 plaintiffs
would be required to demonstrate that information generation would
be worthwhile.
a. Defining the Cause of Action
Of course, the cause of action would have to be well-defined, with
important limitations and constraints, in order to increase the likelihood of its generating useful information. Figure 1 presents one proposal to define and limit such a cause of action. Plaintiffs would have
133. This framing should not make a difference if the limitations are the same, and courts
could be free to consider informational monitoring as a stand-alone tort or as an available equitable remedy under some circumstances. In the context of medical monitoring, for example,
some states permit a cause of action for monitoring, while other states only allow medical monitoring as a remedy for an existing common law or statutory tort. See Aberson, supra note 21, at
1114 (noting these differences).
134. Professor Kenneth Abraham has previously acknowledged that claims for medical monitoring could potentially play a distinct role in helping plaintiffs establish specific causation in
later tort litigation. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the Problem
of Limits, 88 VA. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2002) (“A second, and quite different, conception of medical monitoring does not see it as a distinct form of liability for the tortuously inflicted economic
cost of mitigation, but as a step in the development of evidence for use in subsequent action by
plaintiffs seeking recovery for actual harm from the defendant.”).
135. Id. at 1977–78.
136. A demonstration that, in most states, requires plaintiffs to show that their exposure put
them at a significant increased risk of developing a particular injury for which beneficial treatment exists.
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to show that they were exposed to a specific substance due to the defendant’s tortious conduct (based in, say, trespass, nuisance, or negligence) and that there exist no studies on the potential harm of the
particular substance. Notably, this claim would be available both when
plaintiffs allege present injury and when they do not. At any given
point, some injuries may have already manifested while others are still
dormant. To maximize the informational value of analysis and monitoring, it does not make sense to split plaintiffs into separate categories based on the timing of the lawsuit. Rather the analysis and
monitoring would take account of the varying levels and extent of exposure and the current manifestation of injury.
Plaintiffs’ satisfaction of this burden of production would give rise
to an inference that court-ordered informational analysis and monitoring would be worthwhile in this case. The defendant could rebut
the plaintiffs’ showing by revealing any information it has on the potential harm or safety of the substance—and that information would
be analyzed for its reliability. If the defendant provides no additional
information, then the plaintiffs would obtain an equitable remedy for
the unstudied exposure: the establishment of a scientific panel, paid
for by the defendant, to analyze and monitor plaintiffs’ exposure and
health data.137 If appropriately implemented, such a cause of action
could serve a valuable information-generating function in an age
where science and data increasingly matter in law and policy.138

137. I do not advocate for lump-sum damages because the point is to actually do the analysis
and monitoring. The Supreme Court has already rejected a claim for lump-sum costs in the
medical monitoring context. See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 440
(1997). Instead, my proposal advocates the creation of a court-administered fund to pay an expert panel to analyze and monitor health information. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 71
A.3d 30, 82 (Md. 2013) (describing how such a fund can be administered).
138. The benefits include generating information on the level of optimal care and promoting
better regulation. See discussion supra Part II.
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FIGURE 1. Defining and Distinguishing A New Cause of Action
for Informational Analysis and Monitoring
Did the defendant
act tortiously?
(Proof of tortious
conduct)

YES
YES

NO

Does plaintiff
have proof of
exposure?

NO

NO
Is there
information or
data on the
causal link?
(Proof of value)

Informational
analysis and
monitoring
No informational
analysis and
monitoring

No informational
analysis and
monitoring
No informational
monitoring, but
see availability
of medical
monitoring;
YES
negligent
infliction of
emotional distress;
risk-based
remedies

Importantly, the plaintiffs do not directly receive any monetary
damages. The relevant injury is the exposure to an unstudied substance—and the remedy is funding to study the substance’s long-term
effects. The plaintiffs’ payoffs, then, are (1) the identification of harms
through analysis and monitoring, and (2) if exposure is found to increase the probability of specific harms, the creation of scientific evidence that can be used in future claims for plaintiffs who manifest
these harms.139 The other beneficiaries of the cause of action are the
chosen scientific researchers, who would get funding for the specific
studies, and society at large, which benefits from additional information on whether substances are harmful or not. As the DuPont and
Tonawanda Coke cases demonstrate, courts have been capable of organizing and directing defendants’ money for research or scientific
purposes. Other examples include cases where courts have directed a
portion of punitive damages to particular charities or research founda-

139. There may be multiple firms that use the relevant unstudied substances. Jurisdictions
could vary as to whether other defendants could join others in the action so that they could
contribute to funding the monitoring and analysis. Such joinder makes most sense where exposure is not tied to a particular defendant’s negligent handling or disposal of the substance but
rather related to common uses of the substance, such as when customary handling or disposal is
found to leak or seep into others’ property. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588
(1980). At least, contribution to the research fund could vary based on the degree of a defendant’s culpability. Federal regulation could keep track of users of unstudied substances.
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tions.140 Unlike undirected general scientific research, the questions
that are funded are plaintiff-initiated, focusing efforts on scientific
gaps about which real people are concerned.141
But in order to ensure that the data is reliable, any resulting informational analysis or monitoring must include a large enough exposed
population and control population.142 In the DuPont and Tonawanda
Coke cases, the potential for useful information was high because the
court’s action motivated health analysis and monitoring of large populations—the users of contaminated water systems in one and the entire nearby population in the other. As discussed in Part I, analyzing
the medical history or ordering the medical monitoring of one individual is unlikely to generate useful information about general or specific
causation, and creating and allowing a new cause of action for such a
purpose would not be justified.143 The monitoring and analysis, then,
would necessarily extend beyond the plaintiffs in any given case. The
agreed-upon researchers would develop the study design and recruit
suitable exposed and control participants to maximize useful information for the plaintiffs and the public.
In an ideal case, a large exposed population would join together in a
class action, reducing the cost of identifying and recruiting exposed
participants for analysis and monitoring. In the cause of action proposed in this Article,144 plaintiffs would have to show three elements:
(1) no reliable epidemiological information exists, (2) plaintiffs were
exposed to the substance, and (3) defendant’s tortious conduct caused
the exposure. The first element would be easy to demonstrate on a
class-wide basis.145 The second element would likely require some
type of blood testing to show exposure,146 while the third element
140. See, e.g., Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145 (Ohio
2002) (directing about two-thirds of the plaintiff’s punitive damages to a cancer research fund
established by the court). See also Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages As Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 387 (2003) (discussing diversion of punitive damage awards for general
social-welfare ends).
141. This would be true even if the litigation is organized and financed by an outsider, as the
outsider would only be willing to do this if potential gains exist. The potential gains would be the
expected value of the information in forming the basis for further recovery.
142. See Abraham, supra note 134, at 1985 (arguing that “the most significant difference between the mitigation and evidentiary development perspectives turns on whether there must be
a critical mass of plaintiffs to support a medical monitoring claim”).
143. Id. at 1985–86.
144. See supra Figure 1.
145. Although I propose allowing this cause of action whenever there is no reliable epidemiological data, it is possible to require some showing of potential harm, such as some animal bioassay or other evidence showing a link between the substance and some harm.
146. I propose a limiting requirement of a physical (biological) showing of exposure to the
substance. Alternatively, a court could require a less precise showing of exposure at this stage—
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would require showing that the defendant’s actions in exposing plaintiffs to the substance could be considered tortious147 under theories of
negligence,148 nuisance, or trespass.149 These latter two elements
might be more difficult to demonstrate on a class wide-basis.150 But in
the case of monitoring and analyses, research studies would benefit
from large groups of people with varying levels of exposure.
b. Considering Objections
This new cause of action might appear radical, but it is not much
different in form than claims for medical monitoring and equitable
remedies that courts apply in other circumstances. And in this case,
the benefits would extend beyond benefits for individual plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, it is important to consider potential unintended consequences and, more generally, to compare this kind of solution to other
reasonable alternatives.
One often-cited unintended consequence of creating the related
tort for medical monitoring is the potential to flood the courts with
frivolous actions from uninjured (and therefore lower-priority) plaintiffs, diverting resources away from injured plaintiffs.151 The concern
such as a proximity rule (within a defined area) or a property rule (substance on plaintiffs’ land
or groundwater).
147. The idea here is to limit the cause of action to unconsented exposures.
148. Negligence would include negligence per se, taking advantage of a regulatory violation
similar to the violations in the case study on the Tonawanda Coke Corporation. But it is possible
to allow plaintiffs to simply allege negligence in exposing them to an unstudied substance that
may cause future harms. This would create a low, but not entirely unprecedented, bar to satisfying the element. It would be similar to the showing necessary for a medical monitoring cause of
action in many states. See also Abraham, supra note 134, at 1986 (justifying imposing medical
monitoring costs on the defendant “because the defendant has created a situation in which issues
of disease or injury causation may arise in the future” and therefore “should be responsible for
the costs of its collection”).
149. A trespass-based cause of action would tie the plaintiffs’ exposure to the substance on
their property as a result of the defendant’s discharge of the substance.
150. Take exposure. In one case, a federal court required blood tests from all potential class
members in order to demonstrate sufficient and similar class-wide exposure prior to class certification in a standard toxic torts case. See Rhodes v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 253 F.R.D.
365, 375 (S.D.W. Va. 2008). See also Edward Casmere et al., Toxic Torts and Environmental
Law, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACTICE L.J. 453, 459 (2013). But, in a cause of action for informational monitoring and analysis, the relevant common feature in this cause of action is exposure
to an unstudied substance; the degree of exposure is not relevant, and, in fact, research studies
will benefit from including individuals with varied levels of exposure. In addition, testing of a
representative sample could be allowed to balance the need for biomonitoring data on exposure
before certification and the cost of this data collection. See Hall, Iles & Morello-Frosch, supra
note 1, at 45 (proposing a sampling solution for medical-monitoring class actions). Alternatively,
the defendant could reimburse costs.
151. See Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 22 N.Y.3d 439, 451 (2013) (declining to create a
cause of action for medical monitoring in part to prevent “ ‘tens of millions’ of potential plaintiffs [from] recover[ing] monitoring costs, effectively flooding the courts while concomitantly
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in the informational analysis and monitoring context could be described as two-fold: (1) the defendant has limited resources, and it
should not spend them on information generation, leaving fewer resources available for plaintiffs that manifest injuries; and (2) the court
has limited resources, and it should not use its resources to preside
over causes of actions brought by plaintiffs with speculative injuries.
The first concern relates to defendant’s limited resources. As discussed, reliable epidemiological analysis and monitoring would cost
millions. Through a new tort cause of action, plaintiffs would get defendants to pay for this analysis and monitoring. But, the argument
goes, such liability for analysis and monitoring might bankrupt the defendant and result in insufficient assets to pay for any actual harms. In
other words, instead of compensating those plaintiffs that are actually
injured, the defendants’ resources were misallocated to paying for
mostly frivolous claims. In the case of Tonawanda Coke, the potential
for bankruptcy as a result of the informational studies proved true; the
company filed for bankruptcy in fall 2018.152
But in the absence of this information, plaintiffs that are actually
injured by the defendant would likely be unable to bring viable claims
for reasons discussed in Part I. The true comparison, then, is between
generating this information and possibly bankrupting the defendant
and not generating this information and staying the defendant’s bankruptcy but potentially harming plaintiffs. In industries where insolvency due to this new liability is most likely, there is reason to think
that incentivizing the generation of information is more valuable. Professor Steven Shavell has argued that regulation is preferable when
the actors causing risk might have insufficient assets to pay for the
resulting harm.153 But in order to set regulation at an optimal level,
risk information is especially important. This means that, especially
for industries at risk of becoming bankrupt, producing information
about risk is to very valuable—likely more valuable than protecting
the company’s limited ability to pay out some future claims if harms

depleting the purported tortfeasor’s resources for those who have actually sustained damage”);
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based
Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 850
(2002) (arguing that the “massive number of uninjured claimants presenting anticipatory claims”
could “devour[ ] the defendants’ resources,” forcing them into bankruptcy).
152. Tonawanda Coke went bankrupt before it could pay out the last $2 million of the $12
million required for the studies. See Telvock, supra note 23.
153. Shavell, supra note 33, at 361–62.
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manifest and plaintiffs are able to bring claims. The information could
lead to regulation that would promote optimal risk mitigation.154
The second concern relates to the proper allocation of judicial resources. As an initial matter, it is not clear that the courts’ time is most
valuably spent compensating injured plaintiffs as compared to incentivizing the generation of information on harms.155 Nonetheless, the
concern that this cause of action could give rise to a flood of claims
that will overwhelm limited judicial resources is not far-fetched. Some
have observed that courts that have allowed recovery for medical
monitoring were hit with an “avalanche of claims.”156 In fact, part of
this Article’s motivation is that there are more than 80,000 substances
on the TSCA inventory for which there is no reliable information on
harms. But, through clear limits on the availability of the cause of action, a court can exert control over the number of cases that can be
brought. This Article proposed one way to define this tort, but, as
summarized in Table 1 and noted in several footnotes,157 there are
ways to expand or limit the cause of action from this particular proposal. And, as defined here, the plaintiffs would receive only the equitable remedy of monitoring and analysis; there would be no additional
compensation for emotional harm from the unstudied exposure. The
limited remedy should reduce concerns about plaintiffs seeking out
windfall damages.
In addition, as time goes on, there would presumably be fewer substances that meet the trigger of insufficient information, in part because of successful litigation and in part because some firms might
choose to proactively generate their own data on long-term harms. Of
course, the equitable remedy provided for could increase administrative burdens on the court, at least in the short run. It is reasonable to
expect, however, that current scientific institutions would adapt to
better provide the administrative and research support necessary to
maintain these claims. Overall, whether we think courts should allocate some of their resources to this role depends in part on whether
we think there exist better alternatives to generating this information.

154. Of course, it is still important to consider whether this information should be generated
through a tort vehicle versus a regulatory vehicle. The next Part considers regulatory vehicles.
155. Ideally, state legislatives could make these difficult policy judgments and decide whether
and to what extent such claims should be allowed in courts.
156. See Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber & Emily J. Laird, Medical Monitoring: The Right
Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 382 (2005).
157. See supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text; see also infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1. Options for Defining A Claim for Informational
Analysis and Monitoring
THIS PROPOSAL

(1) No reliable
epidemiological
information exists.

(2) Plaintiffs were
exposed to the
substance.

(3) Defendant’s
tortious conduct
caused the
exposure.

NOTES AND VARIATIONS
I propose allowing this cause of action
whenever there is no reliable epidemiological
data.
Other options: some evidence of potential
harm, such as suggestive animal bioassays
(narrower)
I propose a requirement for evidence of
physical/biological exposure—e.g.,
biomonitoring/blood tests—but no
requirement for other present injury.
Other options: a proximity rule (within a
defined area) (broader); a property rule
(evidence of substance on plaintiffs’ land or
groundwater) (broader); significant exposure
(narrower); some evidence of present injury
(narrower)
I propose a requirement that defendant’s
conduct was tortious in some way.
Other options: no requirement (more likely to
include torts based on consensual exposures);
require some regulatory violation (narrower)

III.

REGULATORY FIXES

Alternatively, regulation can ensure that information on potential
harms is consistently collected and analyzed. For example, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) already tries to address data gaps in several ways for
substances identified as hazardous. Below I discuss how federal and
state governments can better address these gaps through statutory and
regulatory law, drawing lessons from CERCLA.
First, Congress could strengthen federal requirements under TSCA
for generating information about risks, requiring firms to monitor and
analyze effects whenever they detect a release of an unstudied substance into the environment or whenever litigation alleging harm from
the substance commences. These triggers for informational monitor-
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ing and analysis of populations would balance the benefits of allowing
new products and processes on the market before extensive long-term
analysis of their effects with the costs of persistent knowledge gaps on
effects.158 In a way, this kind of a requirement would authorize by
statute a form of the informational monitoring described in Part II. In
fact, TSCA can explicitly enforce such a requirement through the
courts as does CERCLA. In particular, under CERCLA, anyone who
transports hazardous substances is liable for health assessments of affected persons.159 Typically, defendants pay for government-led research on potential harms from the exposure to the hazardous
substances.160 In some circumstances, courts have also allowed private
actions for medical monitoring for releases that would trigger CERCLA cleanup liability.161 Ideally, firms that use unstudied substances
would also be required to post a bond or obtain insurance coverage
for future monitoring and analysis should those responsibilities be
triggered.162
Second, federal and state governments could expand funding for
scientific research into links between harms and substances. Such programs could be modeled after CERCLA’s Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), which was established to
protect “communities from harmful health effects related to exposure
to natural and man-made hazardous substances.”163 The ATSDR focuses on the risks of releases of known hazardous substances and
Superfund sites,164 but there is no reason that it or a similar agency
cannot examine the risks of unstudied substances used in production
more broadly, given sufficient funding. The ATSDR is funded by responsible parties under CERCLA; any similar agency for unstudied
158. Of course, firms could always choose to do more analysis before deployment of new
products and processes.
159. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (West 2016) (stating, under recoverable costs and damages, that “any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport . . . is
liable for . . . the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section
9604(i) of this title”).
160. See id. § 9604(i) (describing the work of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry).
161. See Giovanni v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 906 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2018) (considering
plaintiffs’ requests for medical monitoring as separate from the remedial actions under
CERCLA).
162. This would be especially important for small, undercapitalized firms that use such
substances.
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (West 2016); AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE
REGISTRY, https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ (last visited Jun 15, 2018) [hereinafter ATSDR Website].
164. ATSDR Website, supra note 163; see also Kristen Chapin, Toxic Torts, Public Health
Data, and the Evolving Common Law: Compensation for Increased Risk of Future Injury, 13 J.
ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 129, 132–33 (1993).
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substances should also have a specified funding source. One option is
to have firms that violate any environmental regulations pay into the
fund. But this would displace whatever use states currently make of
these fines, and it might not provide sufficient funding. Another option is to have firms pay into the fund whenever they are found to be
responsible for a release of any unstudied substance. Alternatively,
the program could be linked to successful causes of action for informational monitoring and analysis discussed in Part II. The state
agency would coordinate the informational monitoring, thereby reducing the administrative costs of the tort option.
CONCLUSION
For many substances, there is no reliable information on their potential to cause harm. But such information is required before regulatory, tort, or other risk-management schemes can function efficiently.
Individuals increasingly care about understanding the potential for various substances to cause harm, but there are significant hurdles to
developing this information. This Article proposes a new tort cause of
action that would require firms that use such substances to, under
some circumstances, fund the informational analysis and monitoring
of harms to exposed populations. In particular, plaintiffs would have
to show that they were exposed to a specific substance due to the defendant’s tortious conduct and that there exist no reliable studies on
the potential harm of the particular substance. This showing would
give rise to a rebuttable presumption that court-ordered informational
analysis and monitoring would be worthwhile in this case. A successful
claim would lead to the establishment of a scientific panel, paid for by
the defendant, to analyze and monitor plaintiffs’ exposure and health
data along with data from relevant control populations. The resulting
epidemiological information would make future regulation better and
future litigation more efficient. Such a limited tort cause of action for
informational analysis and monitoring could help society whittle away
at the list of more than 80,000 substances for which we have no reliable information about harms.

